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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”) is a unique 
administrative law venue, one that in recent years has become a hotspot for 
enforcing intellectual property rights.1 Section 337 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act 
of 1930 (“Section 337”) grants the Commission a powerful tool and broad 
discretion: the authority to enjoin parties from importing articles that infringe U.S. 
intellectual property rights.2 In a little over a decade, the number of Section 337 
cases ballooned from only twenty-five in 20003 to “a record high of 103” in 2010.4 
The significant increase in patent-related Section 337 investigations “suggest[s] 
that, contrary to congressional intent, the ITC has become a general forum for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D., 2012, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.M.E., 2008, University of 
Dayton. Thanks to Professor Mark Janis and Andrew Riley, who helped plant the seeds for 
this Comment, and to Claudia and Steve Allen for their continuing support and critiques of 
the Comment. Thanks also to the Indiana Law Journal Board of Editors for accepting this 
Comment and for their superb contributions. 
 1. Thomas A. Broughan, III, Modernizing § 337’s Domestic Industry Requirement for 
the Global Economy, 19 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 41, 41 (2009) (“The [ITC] is an increasingly 
popular venue for entities seeking to enforce their patent rights.”). 
 2. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); see also John C. Evans, Note, Addressing Default Trends 
in Patent-Based Section 337 Proceedings in the United States International Trade 
Commission, 106 MICH. L. REV. 745, 749–50 (2008). 
 3. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2000 16 (2000), 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/year_in_review/PUB3445.pdf. 
 4. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2010 14 (2010), 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/year_in_review/pub4212.pdf. 
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enforcing patent rights rather than a forum for protecting domestic companies.”5 
The trend is so pronounced that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which has appellate jurisdiction over the ITC,6 recently found itself in disagreement 
about the nature of the forum and whether it is “charged . . . with administering a 
statute having a primary purpose of enforcing valid intellectual property rights.”7 
Unlike the Patent Act,8 which provides the statutory authority to bring an action 
for patent infringement in federal district court, the statutory provisions that govern 
Section 337 actions expressly mandate consideration of the public interest when 
determining a remedy for patent infringement.9 The statute provides that “[i]f the 
Commission determines . . . that there is a violation of [the] section, it shall direct 
that the articles concerned . . . be excluded from entry into the United States, 
unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and 
welfare . . . it finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry.”10 
While there is no analogous statutory provision in the Patent Act, consideration 
of the public interest is part of the common law applicable to remedies for patent 
infringement. Historically, only in very “rare instances”11 were patentees denied 
injunctions in the name of the “public interest”—mostly regarding the public 
health.12 The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,13 
however, articulated a rule for granting injunctions that firmly embedded in the 
common law a public interest consideration similar to that implemented by the 
ITC.14 In eBay, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that “a 
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been 
adjudged.”15 The Court instead implemented what is called “the traditional four-
factor test [for injunctions],”16 one factor of which requires the patentee to 
affirmatively show whether “the public interest would . . . be [served or] disserved 
by a permanent injunction.”17 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Broughan, supra note 1, at 43. 
 6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 7. John Mezzalingua Assocs. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Reyna, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (objecting to the majority’s 
characterization of the ITC as “fundamentally a trade forum, not an intellectual property 
forum”). 
 8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006). 
 9. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 12. See, e.g., Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 
F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945) (public interest warranted refusal of injunction on irradiation of 
oleomargarine); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) 
(injunction refused against city operation of sewage disposal plant because of public health 
danger). 
 13. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 14. Id. at 393–94. 
 15. Id. (citing MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
 16. Id. at 393. 
 17. Id. at 391. 
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The Federal Circuit confronted the similarity between the two public interest 
doctrines—the ITC and the common law—in Spansion, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission,18 holding that the two do not necessarily inform one another.19 The 
Federal Circuit held that “[t]he difference between exclusion orders granted under 
Section 337 and injunctions granted under the Patent Act . . . follows the long-
standing principle that importation is treated differently than domestic activity.”20 
Yet, that holding is unfulfilling; one cannot help but compare and contrast the 
two.21 In either scenario, the public interest is positioned to trump an intellectual 
property owner’s fundamental ability to exclude others.22 
There is every indication that the “public interest” is poised to take a more 
prominent role in patent litigation.23 In fact, the ITC recently finalized a rule that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 19. Id.; id. at 1357 (addressing whether “the public interest inquiry in this context is 
similar to the traditional test for injunctive relief that district courts apply under [eBay]”). 
 20. Id. at 1359 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Certain Baseband 
Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control 
Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-
TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, *102 n.230 (USITC June 19, 2007)); see also United States 
v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973). 
 21. Litigants that have been attracted to the ITC because it is perceived as an easier 
forum to seek injunctive relief after eBay certainly might weigh the differences between the 
“public interest factors” of each forum. See, e.g., Broughan, supra note 1, at 73–74 
(comparing and contrasting the eBay factors with the public interest factors used in 
Section 337 investigations, stating: “The equitable discretion available to the ITC differs 
from the discretion granted to district courts when evaluating a permanent injunction; 
however, it is more than adequate to address the problems with [non-practicing entities].” 
(citations omitted)); Robert J. Walters & Christopher G. Paulraj, Is a Revival of the “Public 
Interest” Factors in the Works by the ITC?, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Oct. 
14, 2011), http://news.bna.com/ptdm (“Another benefit recognized by complainants in ITC 
investigations is that the ITC is not bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, which limited the availability of injunctive relief in district court civil 
actions. Nonetheless, it may come as a surprise that the ITC is not necessarily required to 
issue a remedial order . . . .” (emphasis in original)); see also Rules of Adjudication and 
Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,803, 64,806 (Oct. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 
210) (discussing whether the Commission should adopt the standard for obtaining a 
permanent injunction set forth in eBay). 
 22. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights, in LIBERTY, 
PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 156 (Ellen Frankel Paul 
& Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (“The Madisonian explanation gains force when contract 
and property rights are distinguished not on the conventional ground but on a more 
sophisticated legal basis expounded by Professor Wesley Hohfeld. Under his analysis, the 
distinctive feature of property is that it is a right ‘good against the world,’ while contract is a 
right good only against determinate persons . . . .”); Richard B. Klar, Ebay Inc. v. 
Mercexchange, L.L.C.: The Right to Exclude Under U.S. Patent Law and the Public Interest, 
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 852, 858 (2006) (“The constitution provides for the 
framework for a patent owner to have exclusive rights within the system. The right to 
exclude is of primary importance in order to encourage inventors to share their technology 
with the public in exchange for a limited (by time) monopoly.”). 
 23. Broughan, supra note 1, at 73 (“Thus, it is no longer proper to categorically assume 
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will allow the agency to gather more information on the potential public interest 
issues resulting from a Section 337 investigation.24 The new rule requires 
complainants seeking to block allegedly infringing goods from the United States to 
file a separate statement, concurrently with a complaint, discussing the “public 
interest[s]” involved.25 This move shifts the consideration of the public interest 
from the background, a final safety valve, to the very forefront of an 
investigation.26 
At the same time, both patent law commentators and the Federal Circuit have 
signaled that it is important to refocus on intellectual property as a fundamental 
property right. For example, in the Federal Circuit’s recent opinion in Robert Bosch 
LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., Judge O’Malley commented on patent rights in 
the post-eBay era: “[E]ven though a successful patent infringement plaintiff can no 
longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request for a permanent 
injunction, it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the fundamental 
nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude.”27 In 
his recent book, Justifying Intellectual Property,28 Professor Robert Merges makes 
the observation that “courts often wind up talking about IP rights as rights,” but are 
often too busy “to notice the significance of this move.”29 
In response, Merges makes it the purpose of Justifying Intellectual Property to 
“notice” the shift from regarding intellectual property as a system of social utility to 
one of fundamental rights, noting that “the hallmark of a right is that social utility 
alone is not reason enough to override it.”30 Merges develops a framework for 
                                                                                                                 
in every case that the public interest favors injunctive relief in patent infringement cases 
without balancing the interest in IP protection with the public’s countervailing interests.”); 
see also Dennis Crouch, Injunctive Relief and the Public Interest at the ITC, PATENTLYO L. 
BLOG  (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/injunctive-relief-and-the-
public-interest-at-the-itc.html. 
 24. Jacqueline Bell, ITC Adopts New Public Interest Rule for Patent Cases, LAW 360 
(Oct. 19, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/279045; Rossella Brevetti, ITC 
Amends Rules to Get More Info on Public Interest in Section 337 Cases, PAT. TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Oct. 25, 2011), http://news.bna.com/ptdm. 
 25. Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 64,803. The notice states 
that the new regulations are slightly different from the proposed rules which “require that the 
complainant provide in its complaint specific information regarding how issuance of an 
exclusion order and/or a cease and desist order in an investigation could affect the public 
health and welfare in the United States.” Id. at 64,804. The new rules provide that, “instead 
of including public interest information in the complaint, complainants will be required to 
file a separate statement of public interest concurrently with the filing of the complaint.” Id. 
at 64,805. The final regulations contained eleven changes from the proposed rules, published 
in 75 Fed. Reg. 60,671 (Oct. 1, 2010), which were available to the public for comment. 
Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 64,804. 
 26. See Bell, supra note 24. 
 27. 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Zoltek Corp. v. 
United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“My concern 
with my colleagues’ position starts with their apparent rejection of the premise that patents 
are property and subject to the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 28. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). 
 29. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
 30. Id.; see also id. at 302 (“I have tried not to even talk about balance, but instead to 
show what it looks like, in detail.” (emphasis in original)). 
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justifying intellectual property as “a right first” using the philosophical cannons of 
John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls.31 Necessarily, Merges also discusses 
instances when it is permissible to exempt infringement of intellectual property. 
Along a similar, but more narrow vein, this Comment utilizes Merges’s model 
to explore the justifiability of using public interest factors—particularly in the 
ITC—to strip a patent owner of his or her right to exclude and assesses the 
effectiveness of public interest considerations in patent forums. Part I explores the 
development of public interest factors in both federal district court and ITC patent 
litigation. This Part will explore the rare, anomalous cases where the public interest 
has successfully prevailed over an exclusion order and survey several cases where 
public interest was overcome. Part II explores and extracts the relevant portions of 
Professor Merges’s framework for justifying intellectual property, reconciling his 
theories with other theories of property along the way. Part III tests the fact patterns 
of several of the example cases against Merges’s philosophical framework. Finally, 
Part IV assesses the effectiveness of the public interest consideration and suggests 
how litigation arising under the Patent Act might borrow from the experiences of 
the ITC. Part IV proposes that developing and/or codifying a doctrine of 
compulsory licensing in one or both forums might best implement a Merges-type 
framework. It concludes that, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s comments in 
Spansion, the two forums might indeed “inform” one another.32 
I. PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE PATENT LAWS 
While elementary in nature, this discussion must begin with a basic premise: a 
patent is intellectual property and intellectual property is a form of personal 
property.33 By definition, an element of property is the right to exclude others34—it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. Id. at 305 (“I moved from a conventional utilitarian understanding of IP rights to 
something else, something based on the nonutiliatrian philosophical ideas of Locke, Kant, 
and Rawls.”). 
 32. Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see 
also Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. 
L. REV. 529, 533 (2009) (proposing that “Congress amend § 337 to harmonize ITC patent 
law with the Patent Act”). 
 33. See, e.g., Patricia L. Farnese, Patently Unreasonable: Reconsidering the 
Responsibility of Patentees in Today’s Inventive Climate, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 
4 (2004) (“A patent is a property right. Most people associate property rights with 
ownership.”). 
 34. The right to exclude is statutorily recognized under the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(1) (2006). There is a voluminous literature discussing the in rem nature of a 
property right. See, e.g., DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 109 (2000) (stating that “[t]he 
most striking difference between contract law and property law is that while a contract right 
is good only against the other party to the contract, a property right is good against the 
world”); WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 18 (1979) (“The right to property is the 
power to exclude others from or give them access to a benefit or use of the particular 
object.”); Farnese, supra note 33, at 4 (“[Patent] ownership is associated with exclusive 
possession, control and enjoyment of a specific res, by a particular person.”); Oliver Hart & 
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1121 
(1990) (defining property as the “right . . . to exclude others from the use of [an] asset”). 
1052 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1047 
 
is often said that it is a right good against the world.35 That right is not unbounded, 
however: “Because property (like all rights) permits private individuals to bring the 
power of the state to bear against other citizens, the conditions surrounding the use 
of this power are always relevant, always of interest to the legal system.”36 One 
way the fundamental right of a patent owner to exclude others is bounded is by 
consideration of the “public interest.” While the invocation of the public interest as 
a way to circumvent the right to exclude may be considered a “rarity”37 due to its 
historically infrequent success, it is a consideration provided for in actions arising 
under the Patent Act and in ITC investigations. Going forward, litigating and 
adjudicating public interest factors will likely become much more common.38 
A. The Public Interest in the Patent Act 
There is no statutory basis for federal district courts to invoke public interest to 
deny a permanent injunction to a litigant who successfully establishes infringement 
of a valid patent. Rather, public interest enters the scene by way of the common law 
governing remedies. For many years, however, not even the common law allowed 
much equitable discretion over the grant of injunctions. The Federal Circuit, 
established in 198239 with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over causes of action 
arising under the Patent Act,40 established a historical precedent of essentially 
granting injunctions automatically once infringement was found.41 
Historically, the Federal Circuit only denied permanent injunctions in extremely 
“rare instances” where a patentee’s decision not to practice the patent “frustrate[d] 
an important public need for the invention.”42 The Federal Circuit’s preference to 
grant permanent injunction “stems from a belief that once infringement has been 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. For example, William Blackstone once defined property as “that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *2; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001) (stating that one 
conception of property is that “property is a distinctive type of right to a thing, good against 
the world”). 
 36. MERGES, supra note 28, at 12. 
 37. See Walters & Paulraj, supra note 21 (noting that the “ITC has only rarely 
considered these public interest factors to be dispositive in its determination”); Certain Home 
Vacuum Packaging Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-496, USITC 3681, at 3–4 (Mar. 1, 2004) 
(Final); see also Kumar, supra note 32, at 567 (stating that “[i]f the ITC finds that an 
imported article infringes a patent, then the default presumption under § 337 is that it will 
award an exclusion order” and that “denials of injunctive relief after a finding of 
infringement are extremely uncommon”). 
 38. See, e.g., Walters & Paulraj, supra note 21. 
 39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006). The Federal Circuit was established under Ronald 
Reagan’s Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and charged with creating uniformity 
amongst the patent laws. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
 41. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 
1989); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 42. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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established denying a patentee the right to exclude is contrary to the laws of 
property.”43 Before 2006, the case law regarding the public interest in patent 
infringement litigation over permanent injunctions was sparse. Most cases 
containing any relevant discussions about the public interest only did so in the 
context of preliminary injunctions, before a patent was found to be valid and 
infringed.44 
It was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange 
LLC45 that district courts were given, in a practical sense, equitable discretion over 
injunctions in patent infringement cases.46 The Court chastised the Federal Circuit 
for its rigid application of injunctions upon a showing of liability—its “automatic 
rule”—and instead implemented what is described as “the traditional four-factor 
test for injunctions.”47 The Supreme Court took issue with the Federal Circuit’s 
comment that “[i]f the injunction gives the patentee additional leverage in 
licensing, that is a natural consequence of the right to exclude and not an 
inappropriate reward to a party that does not intend to compete in the marketplace 
with potential infringers.”48 Overruling the Federal Circuit, the Court articulated a 
balancing test: 
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a 
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may 
grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered 
an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.49 
Although the Court repeatedly stated that neither of the lower court decisions 
applied what it called the “traditional four-factor framework,” remedies scholars 
have pointed out that there is no such thing as “the traditional test.”50 Before eBay, 
“[r]emedies specialists had never heard of the four-point test.”51 Neither of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. See Klar, supra note 22, at 855 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 and Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. 
Universal Sys. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Del. 2004)). 
 44. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(stating that “the district court's public interest analysis should be whether there exists some 
critical public interest that would be injured by the grant of preliminary relief”); Ethicon 
Endo-Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500, 1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994). 
 45. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 46. See id. at 391. 
 47. See id. at 393–94. 
 48. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 49. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of 
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–
13 (1982)). 
 50. DOUGLAS LAYLOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 426 (4th ed. 2010) (“But there 
was no ‘traditional’ four-part test.”). 
 51. Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. 
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007); see also John M. Golden, The Supreme 
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cases cited by the Court included a four-factor test for permanent injunctions: in 
Amoco, the injunction at issue was a preliminary injunction,52 and in Romero-
Barcelo, while the injunction at issue was granted at the end of a complete trial, it 
was only preliminary in nature.53 Indeed, while “[e]Bay and many of its amici, and 
the U.S. Solicitor General, who was supporting MercExchange, all referred to some 
version of four traditional considerations . . . [t]hey did not all cite the same four 
factors, and none of the lead briefs offered anything so flat footed as the Court’s 
formulation.”54 At least one commentator has gone as far as saying that the 
“Court’s traditional four-factor test appears to have been something of a hoax.”55 
Nevertheless, with respect to the public interest consideration, after eBay a 
plaintiff is now required to affirmatively demonstrate each of the four factors, 
meaning a plaintiff must raise and negate public interest concerns. Regardless of 
whether it is a new factor required for permanent injunctions or possibly a 
restatement of a traditional consideration, the public interest will clearly be a 
concern going forward. In fact, following the eBay decision, district courts have 
declined to issue injunctive relief in approximately one out of every four cases 
where infringement has been shown.56 Left with little guidance by the Court on 
how to apply this “new” factor, the application of public interest will certainly be 
explored by academics and practitioners. There remains the question of when, if 
ever, the public interest is sufficient to deny a patent owner its right to exclude. 
B. The Public Interest in Section 337 Patent Investigations at the ITC 
1. Statutory Background of the “Public Interest” Considerations 
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) provides that  
[i]f the Commission determines . . . that there is a violation of [the] 
section, it shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded from 
entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such 
exclusion upon the public health and welfare . . . it finds that such 
articles should not be excluded from entry.  
Besides the broad and all-encompassing “public welfare,” the statute enumerates 
three other, more specific, considerations: (1) “competitive conditions in the United 
                                                                                                                 
Court as a “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent 
Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 695 (2009) (“According to at least two experts in remedies law, 
there was no widespread tradition of such a test for permanent injunctions.”). 
 52. See Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 542. 
 53. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311–13. 
 54. LAYLOCK, supra note 50, at 427. 
 55. Golden, supra note 51, at 695 (discussing what Golden terms “the four-factor 
mess”). 
 56. See Ernest Grumbles III, Rachel C. Hughey & Susan Perera, The Three Year Anniversary 
of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, 
Nov. 2009, at 26, available at http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/articles/three-year-
anniversary-eBay-MercExchange.asp. 
2013] “JUSTIFYING” THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1055 
 
States economy,” (2) “the production of like or directly competitive articles in the 
United States,” and (3) the “United States consumers.”57 
While the Section 337 investigation originated with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act of 1930, the public interest factors were not included until the passage of the 
Trade Act of 1974.58 At the time, the addition was “[p]erhaps the most novel 
amendment” and “require[d] the Commission, after it has determined that a 
violation does or may exist, to weigh the effect of its actions ‘upon the public 
health and welfare.’”59 Discussing the inclusion of the public interest consideration 
during Section 337 investigations, the Senate Committee reported: 
During its investigations under section 337, the Commission would be 
directed to consult with the Departments of Justice, Health, Education, 
and Welfare, the Federal Trade Commission, and other government 
agencies when appropriate. In making its determinations . . . the 
Commission would be required to take into consideration . . . the effect 
which such action would have on the general health and welfare, on 
competitive conditions in the economy, on the production of like or 
competitive merchandise in the United States, and on consumers. These 
considerations could be overriding.60 
Using similarly superlative language, the Committee further noted that it 
“believe[d] that the public health and welfare and the assurance of competitive 
conditions in the United States economy must be the overriding considerations in 
the administration of [the] statute.”61 It stated that an exclusion order should not be 
issued “in cases where there is any evidence of price gouging or monopolistic 
practices in the domestic industry.”62 
Since the amendment added by the Trade Act of 1974, the language of the 
statute has changed very little. The Commission, however, has recently approved 
new regulations governing the public interest factor of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).63 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006); see also Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 
F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 58. Compare Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 
590, 703, with Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053 (1975), 
and 19 U.S.C § 1337(d) (Supp. 1975). See also Harvey Kaye & Paul Plaia, Jr., 
Developments in Unfair Trade Practices in International Trade: A Review of the Third and 
Fourth Years Under Section 337 as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 61 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 115 (1979). 
 59. Will E. Leonard & F. David Foster, The Metamorphosis of the U.S. International 
Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 719, 754–55 (1976) 
(noting that “[i]t is difficult to assess the significance of this factor”). 
 60. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 35 (1974) (emphasis added). Section 341 of the Trade Act of 
1974 amended Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. A major component of the 
amendments was to give the Commission itself the authority to grant exclusion orders 
instead of the President. The amendment gave the Commission final authority, subject to 
judicial review. § 341, 88 Stat. at 2053. 
 61. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197; see also id. at 193 (“The Committee feels that the 
public interest must be paramount in the administration of this statute.” (emphasis added)). 
 62. Id. at 197. 
 63. See Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,803 (Oct. 19, 2011) (to 
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The amendments have transitioned the consideration of the public interest from a 
final, ancillary step of a Section 337 investigation to a prominent, first step in 
commencing an investigation.64 The new regulations require that complainants file, 
“concurrently with the complaint, a separate statement of public interest.”65 The 
regulations also specify what the submission must address: (1) how the articles are 
used; (2) the public health, safety, or welfare concerns; (3) the directly competitive 
articles that could replace the subject articles; (4) the capacity to replace the volume 
of articles subject to the requested remedial orders; and (5) the impact of exclusion 
on U.S. consumers.66 Without expanding on all the changes implemented by the 
new regulations, suffice it to say that 19 C.F.R. § 210 has been retooled to magnify 
the scrutiny on the public interest factors under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
Practitioners and academics have taken notice.67 
2. Case Examples: Four Successes, Multiple Failures 
Despite the Senate Committee’s statement that the public interest “must be the 
overriding consideration[] in the administration of [the] statute,”68 the ITC has been 
extremely conservative in its use. In fact, the Commission has clearly stated that 
“the public interest favors the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights by 
excluding infringing imports”69 and has only in “rare instances declined to issue 
permanent relief when the adverse effect on the public interest was greater [than] 
the interest in protecting rights secured by valid patents.”70 Since the public interest 
consideration was mandated in 1974, there have been only four instances where the 
Commission found that the public interest required denial of an injunctive remedy. 
Those cases are worth exploring to determine the outer contours of the public 
interest exception as the patent bar moves forward with public interest in the 
spotlight. 
In Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders,71 an investigation involving the 
importation of proprietary automotive crankpin grinding machines, the 
Commission announced that, for “the first time,” it had “determined that the public 
interest factors preclude[d] imposition of a remdy [sic].”72 After reciting the 
relevant legislative history, the Commission discussed how “the availability of 
crankpin grinders to Ford is a critical element in Ford’s program to meet the fuel 
                                                                                                                 
be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 210). 
 64. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.8(b) (2012). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See, e.g., Walters & Paulraj, supra note 21; see also Rules of Adjudication and 
Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 64,803–05 (discussing the comments received by the Notice of 
Proposed Rule under 75 Fed. Reg. 60671 (Oct. 1, 2010)). 
 68. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197 (1974). 
 69. Certain Two-Handle Centerset Faucets and Escutcheons, and Components Thereof, 
Inv. No. 337-TA-422, USITC Pub. 3332, at 9 (July 2000) (Final). 
 70. Certain Home Vacuum Packaging Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-496, USITC Pub. 3681, 
at 3–4 (Mar. 1, 2004) (Final) (emphasis added) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 71. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022 (Dec. 
1979) (Final). 
 72. Id. at 18. 
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economy standards mandated by Congress.”73 A crankpin is a pivotal component in 
converting linear motion from the piston into rotary motion. The crankpin grinder 
is a piece of large industrial machinery, weighing nearly twenty tons, that shapes 
the pins to the correct diameter and finish.74  
Significantly, Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders was filed amidst the energy 
crisis of 1979—a result of the Iranian Revolution.75 Oil production had been 
disrupted in the Middle East, and U.S. consumers, with fresh memories of the 
energy crisis of 1973,76 began to buy gasoline in a panic and prepare for gasoline 
rationing.77 The court was swayed by “the fact that Congress and the 
President . . . established a policy requiring automotive companies to 
increase . . . fuel economy . . . and that some of these companies [were] 
encountering difficulties in obtaining automatic crankpin grinders on a timely 
basis.”78 Without taking the next logical step and establishing a direct correlation 
between crankpin grinders and the ultimate, laudable goal of high fuel economy, 
the ITC found “that the public interest considerations . . . are stronger than 
complainant’s rights to enforcement of its patent monopoly.”79 
Interestingly, however, “[d]espite the gas lines and the president’s warnings, 
most Americans remain[ed] doubtful that there [was] a ‘real’ oil shortage stemming 
from a genuine depletion of oil resources.”80 In fact, the actual oil production 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id. Congress had mandated higher efficiency cars under the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards of 1975, and it was the first time fuel economy regulations were 
imposed on passenger cars—for example, 18.0 miles per gallon by 1978. See Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (establishing the CAFE 
standards); see also, e.g., Roger H. Bezdek & Robert M. Wendling, Fuel Efficiency and the 
Economy, 93 AM. SCIENTIST 132, 132 (2005). 
 74. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 6, 
15 (Dec. 1979) (Final). 
 75. See JOHN D. STEMPEL, INSIDE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 165–94, 317–18 (1981); 
HEATHER LEHR WAGNER, MILESTONES IN MODERN WORLD HISTORY: THE IRANIAN 
REVOLUTION 63–75 (2010) (“By December 1978, the violence in Iran seemed out of 
control.”). 
 76. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1973 OIL EMBARGO: ENERGY 
TRENDS SINCE THE FIRST MAJOR U.S. ENERGY CRISIS 1 (1998) (stating that “[t]he 1973 Arab 
Oil Embargo was the first oil supply disruption to cause major price increases and a 
worldwide energy crisis” and that “[v]irtually all spare oil production capacity was in the 
Middle East when the Arab Oil Embargo began in October 1973” while also providing 
excellent graphical representations of energy trends over the past several decades); see also 
ROBERT E. HUNTER, THE ENERGY ‘CRISIS’ AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 3 (1973) (“Since 1972, 
concern has been growing . . . about an impending energy ‘crisis.’ This concern was 
dramatized by the shortage of fuel oil in the Eastern and Middle Western states during the 
winter of 1972-73 . . . .”). 
 77. See, e.g., DAVID T. HARTGEN, ALFRED J. NEVEU, JOANNA M. BRUNSO, JOHN S. 
BANAS & JEANMARIE MILLER, CHANGES IN TRAVEL IN RESPONSE TO THE 1979 ENERGY CRISIS 
(1979). 
 78. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 20 
(Dec. 1979) (Final). 
 79. Id. at 20–21. 
 80. Al Richman, The Polls: Public Attitudes Toward the Energy Crisis, 43 PUB. OPINION 
Q. 576, 576 (1979); see also Peter Deutsch, The Phony Oil Crisis, 228 NATION 423 (1979); 
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statistics show that much of the crisis was really just an “onslaught of crisis 
propaganda manufactured by the Department of Energy in order to make way for 
oil price decontrol and relaxation of environmental protections laws”81 that 
allegedly served to benefit mainly large oil corporations like Exxon Corporation.82 
The “Big Three” American car manufacturers were, in reality, struggling to 
compete in a market with new compact Japanese and Chinese cars.83 American car 
manufactures like Ford and General Motors were in a crisis of their own, failing to 
produce profitable cars on a timely basis—a problem separate from their ability to 
meet congressional demands on fuel efficiency.84 The true public interest may very 
well have been the value of having successful (that is, profitable) American car 
manufacturers and American oil companies, not the public’s interest in fuel-
efficient cars.85 As one dissenting commissioner stated, the case was not one of 
price gouging or monopolistic prices, as discussed by Congress in the legislative 
history of the Trade Act of 1974.86 In fact, the complainant’s prices were actually 
lower than the prices of the imported grinder.87 
                                                                                                                 
David Popp, Induced Innovation and Energy Prices, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 160 (2002); Philip 
K. Verleger, Jr., The U.S. Petroleum Crisis of 1979, 1979 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY 463. 
 81. Deutsch, supra note 80, at 423; see also ANTONY C. SUTTON, ENERGY: THE CREATED 
CRISIS 119, 137, 145–47 (1979) (arguing that the energy crisis was a “delusion” 
manufactured by Washington bureaucrats and that the framework for the “created crisis” was 
established long before 1979). 
 82. Deutsch, supra note 80, at 425. “Once again it appears that there is no significant 
shortage and that the oil companies and the Energy Department are working together to take 
full advantage of a political situation.” Id. at 426 (emphasis added); see also SUTTON, supra 
note 81. 
 83. See Howard Geller, Philip Harrington, Arthur H. Rosenfeld, Satoshi Tanishima & 
Fridtjof Unander, Polices for Increasing Energy Efficiency: Thirty Years of Experience in 
OECD Countries, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 556, 561 (2006) (discussing how the Japanese, among 
other Asian nations, had instituted energy-efficient research and development schemes and 
legal policies in the early 1970s); Young-suk Hyun & Jinjoo Lee, Can Hyundai Go It 
Alone?, 22 LONG RANGE PLAN. 63 (1989). 
 84. See Carol A. MacLennan, Political Response to Economic Loss: The Automotive 
Crisis Of 1979-1982, 14 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY & STUD. CULTURAL SYS. & WORLD ECON. 
DEV. 21, 25–27 (1985) (discussing the economic turmoil of domestic auto manufacturers); 
see also ALAN ALTSHULER, MARTIN ANDERSON, DANIEL JONES, DANIEL ROOS & JAMES 
WOMACK, THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE: THE REPORT OF MIT’S INTERNAL AUTOMOBILE 
PROGRAM vii (1986) (“[T]he world economy was entering the worst economic downturn 
since the Great Depression, and the auto industry was among the hardest-hit sectors.”). 
 85. Interestingly, only four parties even filed statements weighing in on the public 
interest factors prior to the October 29, 1979 hearing: two government agencies (which had 
no advice), General Motors Corporation, and Caterpillar Tractor Company. See Certain 
Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, at 4–5 (Dec. 1979) 
(Final). 
 86. See id. at 1 (Comm. Moore’s supplemental views); S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 21 
(1974). 
 87. See Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022, 
at 1 (Dec. 1979) (Final) (Comm. Moore’s supplemental views) (warning that “[a] patent is a 
constitutionally granted monopoly”). 
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One year after Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the Commission once 
again found that public interest factors trumped the property right of a patent holder 
in Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes.88 The infringing accelerator tubes 
were being used by several universities to study nuclear structure and were 
allegedly “greatly superior in performance” to others in the market.89 The 
Commission found “that basic scientific research, such as . . . nuclear structure 
research . . . is precisely the kind of activity intended by Congress to be included 
when it required the Commission to consider . . . the public health and welfare.”90 
Like Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, this case arose against a unique 
political backdrop: the Cold War91 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.92 In 
1979, the United States was re-engaged in a nuclear arms race, stationing 
intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe93 and developing a confrontational 
policy that later became known as the Strategic Defense Initiative.94 
The Commission performed a balancing test that weighed the “impact of a 
remedy on users of the imported device versus the impact of the violation on the 
owner of the patent.”95 Without significant justification, the Commission stated that 
it believed that researchers “are not motivated solely by expectation of a profit in 
the way that holders of more conventional product and process patents are.”96 The 
Commission insinuated that the property right conferred by a patent is merely a 
conduit for profit and that where profits are not a motivation, the patent right is 
otherwise free to be derogated. It stated that its determination “denies part of the 
rewards of having conducted that research in the past, but broadens the benefit to 
the public now by permitting research with a wider range of devices.”97 Under such 
logic, any patent right that could be useful to basic research, if left unenforced, 
might fail the public interest balancing test. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (Dec. 1980) (Final). 
 89. Id. at 27. 
 90. Id. at 22. 
 91. See generally MATTHEW FARISH, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICA’S COLD WAR (2010); 
RICHARD SMOKE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE COLD WAR (3d ed. 1993). 
 92. See M. HASSAN KAKAR, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND THE AFGHAN 
RESPONSE, 1979-1982, at 1–17 (1995). 
 93. SMOKE, supra note 91. 
 94. The Initiative was prompted by President Ronald Reagan’s 1979 visit to the 
NORAD command base under Cheyenne Mountain and new developments in nuclear 
weaponry, such as the x-ray laser invented by the fabled “O Group.” See, e.g., REBECCA S. 
BJORK, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: THE SYMBOLIC CONTAINMENT OF THE NUCLEAR 
THREAT 12–17 (1992); JOHN A. JUNGERMAN, UNIV. CAL. INST. ON GLOBAL CONFLICT & 
COOPERATION, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: A PRIMER AND CRITIQUE (1998). 
 95. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119, 
at 29 (Dec. 1980) (Final). 
 96. Id. at 31. 
 97. Id. 
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Four years later, the Commission again denied relief in light of the public 
interest in a case captioned Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus.98 The 
Commission determined it was not in the public interest to exclude the importation 
of specialized hospital beds for burn patients where the complainant could not meet 
the demand and where no comparable substitute was available.99 In its brief 
opinion, the Commission focused on the ability of the complainant to meet the 
production and distribution needs of the public in the “expanding market” for 
specialized burn beds.100 The Commission ultimately agreed with the 
administrative law judge that “if a temporary exclusion order were issued some 
patients might not have access to burn beds at all in the interim period.”101 In other 
words, because the complainant’s own industry and invention, leading to its grant 
of a patent, created a successful and expanding market where there had once been 
none, the public interest now trumped the exclusionary rights responsible for the 
market in the first place. The opinion provides an unsatisfying and circular 
justification for eviscerating a constitutionally granted property right, even if only 
dealing with a temporary exclusion order. 
In 2011, the Commission issued a fourth opinion in which it found that the 
public interest demanded that certain infringing 3G handheld wireless 
communication devices, such as mobile phones and PDAs, that were “previously 
imported” were exempt from the exclusion order.102 In Certain Baseband 
Processor Chips,103 Broadcomm sued Qualcomm for importing patent-infringing 
wireless communication device patents that had implications for the 3G networks 
throughout the entire country.104 In particular, “first responders”105 throughout the 
nation testified to the adverse effect that exclusion would have on their ability to 
protect the public in case of an emergency because they relied heavily on GPS 
positioning systems and the ED-VO infrastructure generally.106 
Artfully noting that “we do not accept the general proposition that, if the 
infringing activity is great enough, the public interest forbids a remedy,” the 
Commission structured relief that “ha[d] a much more limited impact on 
availability of 3G-capable handsets, and thus a lesser impact on the public 
interest.”107 Unlike the earlier cases, the Commission developed a detailed opinion 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-182/188, USITC Pub. 1667 (Oct. 1984) (Final). 
 99. Id. at 23. 
 100. Id. at 20. 
 101. Id. at 23. 
 102. Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) 
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Prods. Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone 
Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 3 (Oct. 2011) (Final). [hereinafter 
“Certain Baseband Processor Chips”]. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. “First responders” refers to emergency personnel who arrive first at the scene of 
an accident and those in the first response chain of information, such as dispatchers. 
 106. Id. ED-VO is a complex telecommunications standard for wireless data 
transmissions through radio signals that involves multiplexing techniques to optimize data 
throughput. 
 107. Id. at 153 (structuring a “grandfathering” exception for those devices that had 
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and recognized Senate testimony regarding the fundamental nature of patent 
rights108 that had become oft-cited rhetoric in ITC opinions.109 When deciding to 
limit Broadcomm’s relief, the Commission in Certain Baseband Processor Chips at 
least outwardly recognized that “[t]he importation of any infringing merchandise 
derogates from the statutory right, diminishes the value of the intellectual property, 
and thus indirectly harms the public interest.”110 Presumably, the Commission also 
internalized111 the fundamental nature of patents as a property right articulated in its 
opinion. 
Apart from these four examples, in the vast majority of cases, the public interest 
was either not considered or found not to trump the interest of having strong 
intellectual property rights. In particular, and notably, the Commission has 
repeatedly found that evidence that an exclusion order could lead to higher prices is 
not dispositive of the public interest.112 This was true even in Certain Crystalline 
Cefadroxil Monohydrate,113 where a pharmaceutical grade oral antibiotic was in 
dispute.114 The Commission held the public interest did not support denying an 
exclusion order that would lead to higher pharmaceutical drug prices.115 
                                                                                                                 
already been imported). 
 108. The Senate stated: 
The owner of intellectual property has been granted a temporary statutory right 
to exclude others from making, using or selling the protected property. The 
purpose of such temporary protection, which is provided for in Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, is “to promote the Progress of 
Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” In return for 
temporary protection, the owner agrees to make public the intellectual property 
in question. This trade-off creates a public interest in the enforcement of 
protected intellectual property rights. Any sale in the United States of a product 
covered by an intellectual property right is a sale that rightfully belongs only to 
the holder or licensee of that property. The importation of any infringing 
merchandise derogates from the statutory right, diminishes the value of the 
intellectual property, and thus indirectly harms the public interest. 
S. REP NO. 100-71 at 128–29 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 109. See, e.g., Certain Elec. Connectors and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-
374, USITC Pub. 2981, at 19 (July 1996) (“First, the public interest favors the protection of 
U.S. intellectual property rights.”); Certain Power Supply Controllers and Prods. Containing 
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-541, USITC Pub. 3993, at 10 (May 2008) (Final). 
 110. Certain Baseband Processor Chips, No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 64 n.231 
(Oct. 2011) (Final) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-71 at 128–29 (1987)). 
 111. “Internalization” here refers to the sociological and psychological meaning of the 
term regarding the process of accepting norms, instead of the economic meaning. 
 112. See, e.g., Certain Auto. Parts, Inv. No. 337-TA-557, USITC Pub. 4012, (June 2008) 
(Final). 
 113. Inv. No. 337-TA-293, USITC Pub. 2391 (June 1991). 
 114. Id. (finding that the public interest did not support denying an exclusion order that 
would lead to higher drug prices for the oral antibiotic in dispute). 
 115. Id. 
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II. JUSTIFYING PATENTS AS RIGHTS 
In his most recent book, Professor Robert Merges points out the need to “notice” 
the shift from regarding intellectual property as a system of social utility to one of 
fundamental rights.116 He makes an astute observation that is easily overlooked—
that “courts often wind up talking about IP rights as rights,” but are often too busy 
“to notice the significance of this move.”117 The truth of Merges’s observation can 
be seen in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s recent opinion in 
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.118 Judge O’Malley, discussing 
post-eBay injunctions, wrote: “[E]ven though a successful patent infringement 
plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request 
for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the 
fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to 
exclude.”119 In other words, the courts once again spoke directly about intellectual 
property as a fundamental right—a genuine right to exclude—but left the reader 
without any substantive guidance about the true foundation or implications of such 
a statement. 
The same is true for cases at the ITC. As can be seen from the four cases in 
which the use of “public interest” factors were found to outweigh the exclusion 
privileges conferred by a valid patent to its owner, the ITC often uses the term 
“patent right” in the same offhand manner that concerned Merges about intellectual 
property generally. For example, in Certain Home Vacuum Packing Products, a 
case where public interest did not prevail over the patent, the Commission stated 
simply that there is an “interest in protecting rights secured by valid patents”120 and 
in Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, a case where public interest won out, the 
Commission again merely tossed out the notion of a “complainant’s rights to 
enforcement.”121 More recently, the Commission has relied on language from 
Congress discussing a patentee’s “temporary statutory right to exclude others” in 
regards to the Intellectual Property Clause.122 
In light of the development of the ITC as an intellectual property forum123 and 
the obvious implications of new rules regarding the public interest consideration of 
Section 337,124 it is helpful to use Merges’s framework as a set of directional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. MERGES, supra note 28, at 3. 
 117. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 118. 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 119. Id. at 1149 (emphasis added). 
 120. Inv. No. 337-TA-496, USITC Pub. No. 3681, at 17 (Mar. 2004) (Final) (emphasis 
added). 
 121. Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. No. 1022, at 21 (Dec. 1979) (Final). 
 122. See Certain Baseband Processor Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. No. 
4258, at 65 (Oct. 2011) (citing S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 128–29 (1987)) (“The purpose of such 
temporary protection, which is provided for in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United 
States Constitution, is ‘to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.’”). 
 123. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 24; Brevetti, supra note 24. 
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beacons where “public interest” can too easily become victim to subjective 
applications.125 Since Merges states that “theory at this [high] level can only point 
us to general considerations, [and] can only help restructure the issues in a way that 
gives us some insight into the deeper principles at stake in a specific dispute,” it is 
valuable to focus it and compress it further.126 
A. The Justifying Intellectual Property Foundational Framework 
Merges’s foundational framework for justifying intellectual property is based on 
the blended philosophical theories of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John 
Rawls.127 These three philosophers espouse beliefs that seek to explain the nature 
and utility of property conventions. Professor Merges argues that a new framework 
of justification is needed because the “[c]urrent convention . . . that IP law seeks to 
maximize the net social benefit of the practices it regulates” is “[i]mpossibly 
complex” and “will always be at best aspirational.”128 Utilitarian formulation, from 
Merges’s perspective, will never provide a “lock-solid, airtight case, a case we can 
confidently take to an unbiased jury of hardheaded social scientists.”129 Instead, 
Merges advocates a theory of intellectual property derived from “a much richer, 
more complex, at times more confounding understanding of what property is all 
about.”130 Particularly relevant to the idea of public interest in patent law is that this 
theory would replace the always-subjective utilitarian balancing factors with 
nonutilitarian normative conceptions of patent law—fundamentally changing the 
analysis of when public interest trumps a patent, as a right. 
1. John Locke 
There is an expansive body of work directed to the works of John Locke. 
Lockean principles are many; they are widely known, and they are the subject of 
voluminous commentary. The notion that Merges’s theory is extensive enough to 
encapsulate and utilize the entire labyrinth of Locke’s work would be foolish; more 
importantly, it would be entirely unhelpful to the pursuit of justifying a system of 
intellectual property using nonutilitarian foundations because it would be 
unworkable. Much of the value in Merges’s work lies in what he chooses to 
emphasize. In a similar fashion, Merges’s entire discussion of Lockean principles 
would not be helpful to the question of using the public interest as a way to deny 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. See Italo H. Ablondi & H. Henning Vent, Section 337 Import Investigations—Unfair 
Import Practices, 4 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 27, 35 n.57 (1981) (“One issue raised is 
the extent to which the Commission’s consideration of public policy factors should reflect a 
developed adjudicative record at the risk of being found arbitrary.”). 
 126. MERGES, supra note 28, at 308. 
 127. Id. at 305. 
 128. Id. at 2–3 (“Estimating costs and benefits, modeling them over time, projecting what 
would happen under counterfactuals (such as how many novels or pop songs really would be 
written in the absence of copyright protection, and who would benefit from such a 
situation)—these are all overwhelmingly complicated tasks.”). 
 129. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 130. Id. at 13. 
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patent owners the ability to exclude others from making, using, or selling their 
patent property. As such, this Article will reflect upon only the essentials of the 
discussion. 
Merges starts with Locke’s “labor theory” of appropriation: labor as a 
justification for property rights. The theory is derived from Section 27 of Locke’s 
Second Treatise on Government, which now enjoys fabled notoriety.131 The 
operative phrase from the lengthy passage is “[w]hatsoever then he removes out of 
the State that Nature hath provided . . . he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned 
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.”132 From this 
phrase the notion of mixing one’s labor with things from nature to create dominion 
over the thing is derived. Merges seems to avoid the notion of mixing, however, 
instead focusing on the expenditure of effort: “individual appropriation comes 
about through effort.”133 This type of appropriation is appropriate, in Locke’s view, 
under both theological (i.e., divine directives) and a mix of nontheological 
reasoning.134 
Locke’s theory of “one-to-one mapping between individual people and discrete 
economic resources”135 is directly applicable to intellectual property, and 
particularly applicable for patents. From this Author’s perspective, Locke’s notion 
of nature as an enormous realm of common resources parallels the idea of the 
universe of prior art136 often utilized by patent scholars. One way to determine 
obviousness137 in patent law is to think of the person having ordinary skill in the 
art138 (“PHOSITA”) standing in a workshop with the entire relevant prior art before 
him and then to decide whether it would have been obvious for the PHOSITA to 
create the claimed invention. From such a specific patent law example, not 
considered directly by Merges, it is easy to expand on Merges’s belief that “[t]he 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 132. Id. at 288. 
 133. MERGES, supra note 28, at 35. 
 134. Id. at 34. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Prior art is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2006) as inventions “known or used 
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country” and things “described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in 
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States.” Prior art is considered to be art that is contained in the public 
domain and accessible. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“‘[P]ublic 
accessibility’ . . . [is] the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed 
publication’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”). 
 137. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is 
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”). 
 138. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141.03 (8th ed. 2001, rev. vol. 
2012) (“The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to 
have known the relevant art at the time of the invention.”). 
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stock of public domain information, from which individual creators draw, fits 
closely with Locke’s conception of a vast realm of common resources.”139 
Running with the idea of the “universe of prior art” and an obviousness 
determination discussed above, Locke’s theory of labor being mixed with nature 
also matches well with intellectual types of property—specifically with patents. For 
example, discussing intellectual property rights generally, Merges states that “some 
well-known doctrines in IP law provide that ‘mere’ labor (or hard work) is not 
always enough to establish an IPR, nontrivial creations presumably requiring 
significant effort are often said to be at the heart of IP law.”140 While not 
specifically mentioned, Section 103 obviousness is an example of one such 
intellectual property doctrine. The obviousness doctrine is, in some regards, a 
measure of expenditure of labor or ingenuity; the patent laws do not reward merely 
trivial or obvious progression in the arts and sciences. Merges teases from Locke’s 
works a similar “proportionality principle”141 that correlates the effort expended in 
labor with the bounds of property rights.142 
An important aspect of Locke’s philosophy that Merges adopts is that of 
“human prospering through individual appropriation.”143 In Locke’s world, “the 
passion for material appropriation is viewed as fundamental, even primary, in 
motivating the creation acts of the individual.”144 Or, as Merges phrases it: “Few 
would bother laboring to recast, reshape, or improve [materials they find in their 
environment] if that work had to be shared with all comers.”145 Merges’s 
framework, at its heart, requires a belief that endeavoring to create and to make 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. MERGES, supra note 28, at 33. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 159–91. In chapter six of Justifying Intellectual Property, Merges explores 
what he terms “The Proportionality Principle” and emphasizes its importance above other 
principles that he espouses throughout the book. Id. at 159. In that chapter the eBay case is 
discussed at length and the concept of undue leverage plays prominently. See id. at 165–91. 
 142. Locke also directly states: “The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give 
us Property, does also bound that Property too.” JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: 
JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 121 (1980) (emphasis in original) (quoting LOCKE, supra 
note 131, at 290); see also KIRSTIE M. MCCLURE, JUDGING RIGHTS: LOCKEAN POLITICS AND 
THE LIMITS OF CONSENT 87 (1996) (“In most of his treatment of the property right 
appropriate to human agents in the state of nature, Locke continues to articulate this 
harmonious relationship between law and rights in constructions that consistently imply the 
boundedness of property right by considerations of proper use.”). 
 143. MERGES, supra note 28, at 38. Merges focuses on the idea that “[t]he need to survive 
and thrive . . . justifies removal from nature.” Id. at 41. It is also the focus on labor as an 
“extra force” or an “external manifestation of a person’s self” that separates and clarifies 
Merges’s framework from a plain reading of Locke’s “mixing” metaphor that might allow 
claims to property where Merges would find such claims undeserving. Id. at 42–44; see also 
id. at 46 (discussing the Nozick-Waldron hypothetical stating that “[t]hey take us away from 
the things Locke was centrally concerned with, human flourishing and the role of labor”). 
 144. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY 25 (2010) (quoting Sibyl 
Schwarzenbach, Locke’s Two Conceptions of Property, 14 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 141, 157 
(1988)). 
 145. MERGES, supra note 28, at 37.  
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useful things is fundamental to the purpose of life, similar to Locke’s divine 
directive,146 and that such a quest requires labor.147 
To Merges, as important as Locke’s “labor theory” of appropriation or initial 
grant of property are three of Locke’s so-called “provisos.” Merges perceives the 
provisos as “limiting, cabining elements even within [Locke’s] theory of initial 
appropriation.”148 In that regard, the provisos are vital to an understanding of how 
public interest factors may be used in patent litigation to justly limit a patent 
owner’s right to exclude. The three provisos are (1) the sufficiency proviso,149 (2) 
the spoliation or waste proviso,150 and (3) the charity proviso.151 
Unlike some other scholars,152 Merges views the sufficiency proviso and the 
spoliation proviso as two separate requirements. Where others might view the 
spoliation requirement as subsumed in the sufficiency proviso, under Merges’s 
framework it is possible to “take objects from the common[s], leaving ‘enough, and 
as good’ for others, and yet allow those objects to spoil” or go to waste.153 While 
logic might suggest that the type of appropriation that meets the sufficiency 
condition is necessarily modest and, therefore, not wasteful, Merges believes that 
Locke would have seen any spoilage as an “intrinsic affront to nature” even where 
the appropriator was mindful of others.154 Thus, under this model, one may not 
have a justifiable, legitimate claim of appropriation without avoiding both the 
spoilage and sufficiency conditions. These conditions play prominently in an 
understanding of when, under a nonutilitarian model for intellectual property such 
as Merges’s, the public interest overcomes an alleged property right. 
Merges provides a few helpful insights into what situations might constitute a 
violation of the provisos—including several that bear directly on fact patterns 
found in the ITC cases where public interests overcame patent rights.155 First, with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. Usefulness is a critical aspect for Merges. See id. at 47. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 48. 
 149. See LOCKE, supra note 131, at 288 (“For this Labour being the unquestionable 
Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at 
least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” (second emphasis 
added)). 
 150. See LOCKE, supra note 131, at 290 (“But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As 
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may 
by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs 
to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.” (second emphasis added)). 
 151. See LOCKE, supra note 131, at 170 (“God the Lord and Father of all, has given no 
one of his Children such a Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of this World, but 
that he has given his needy Brother a Right to the Surplusage of his Goods; so that it cannot 
justly be denyed him, when his pressing Wants call for it. And therefore no Man could ever 
have a just Power over the Life of another by Right of property in Land or Possessions; since 
[it would] always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for want of 
affording him Relief out of his Plenty.” (emphasis added)). 
 152. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Enough and as Good Left for Others, 29 PHIL. Q. 319 
(1979). 
 153. MERGES, supra note 28, at 51. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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regard to sufficiency, is the problem of reliance. Discussing the scholarship of 
Wendy Gordon, Merges notes that “[a]n original creator can add something that 
others come to depend on in an important way” and that “if that creator tries to 
remove what he or she has added, people may experience an important loss.”156 
Merges recognizes the merit of Gordon’s reliance arguments; he is aware that it is 
possible to make people worse off by exposing them to a massive influx of culture, 
only to have it removed by expansive intellectual property rights. Importantly, 
however, under his framework it is ultimately recognized that “[m]ost contributions 
to culture are . . . like isolated drops in [a] lake” and removing them “would barely 
cause a ripple.”157 It is truly the rare, canonical invention that changes the 
baseline158—most everything in the realm of intellectual property usually meets the 
sufficiency condition.159 Additionally, the reliance aspect of the sufficiency proviso 
comes into play at the postgrant stage of property rights, and seems to fit better 
with Merges’s conception of proportionality, discussed below. 
Second, with regards to spoliation, Merges takes a strict view on what 
constitutes spoliation. Merges interprets Locke as requiring appropriation followed 
by no productive use at all—“not unsatisfied demand.”160 Merges goes further, 
stating: “It follows that only someone who never embodies it in any tangible 
medium at all, or who embodies a rough version of it in a single prototype and just 
lets it sit somewhere, unused, has engaged in Lockean spoliation.”161 Simply put: a 
very difficult standard to achieve. 
Finally, with regard to the third proviso, the charity proviso, Merges calls 
particular attention to the literal language of Locke’s First Treatise.162 The relevant 
passage states that “no Man could ever have a just Power over the Life of another, 
by Right of property” and that no man is “to let his Brother perish for want of 
affording him Relief out of his Plenty.”163 Like the spoilage proviso, this too is 
strictly construed by Merges. Essentially, Merges draws a line between “basic 
human sustenance,” those things that might otherwise literally lead “to let [a] 
brother perish,” like life-saving drugs, and “cultural development,” those things 
that simply lead to types of “human flourishing and development.”164 Under his 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. MERGES, supra note 28, at 52; see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 
YALE L.J. 1533, 1567 (1993) (“[O]nce a creator exposes her intellectual property to the 
public, and that product influences the stream of culture and events, excluding the public 
from access to it can harm.”). “The creator’s contribution adds so significantly to what was 
there that it is wrong to permit the creator to pull back what he or she contributed, to remove 
it from circulation.” MERGES, supra note 28, at 53. 
 157. MERGES, supra note 28, at 55. 
 158. Id. at 52–53. 
 159. Id. at 55 (“First Amendment principles, IP doctrine, self-interest, and enforcement 
costs all conspire to make it difficult and unprofitable to overenforce IP rights, thereby 
pulling a protected work back from public accessibility.”). 
 160. Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. at 58; see also id. at 61 (“Locke [was] concerned with abject waste.”). 
 162. LOCKE, supra note 131. 
 163. Id. at 170. 
 164. MERGES, supra note 28, at 64–65 (“[I]n my view IP rights are limited only in actual 
cases where IP is enforced in a way that interferes with sustenance or survival.” (emphasis 
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framework, only where intellectual property enforcement practices actually lead to 
situations of life and death would the charity proviso come into play with regard to 
patent rights.165 
In summary, Merges's framework utilizes notions of Lockean appropriation 
wherein things are “pluck[ed] . . . out of the found environment and 
[brought] . . . into a more personal zone, where they can be of use to the individual” 
in a manner that required expenditure of labor.166 This is the basis of the initial 
appropriation of an intellectual property right, but Merges also recognizes that the 
rights of the appropriator are not unbounded and turns to three provisos for those 
limits.167 While the provisos might be read broadly by some, under Merges’s model 
they “lead a mostly closeted existence” with regards to intellectual property and are 
not often justifiably invoked.168 
2. Immanuel Kant 
Departing from seventeenth century theories of natural law, Merges brings into 
his framework the observational moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant on 
property.169 With Kant, the focus is on the individual, on autonomy: “To make full 
use of things, to impose their will on things and thereby do the sorts of projects 
they need to do, people must be free to use all sorts of objects in all sorts of 
ways.”170 It is morally justifiable, in the abstract, for individuals to control objects 
that further their plans, goals, and free will. Unlike his contemporaries, Kant’s 
conception of a property system starts with the individual—an individual’s need to 
control and impart his or her own free will is the impetus for the need for a system 
of property.171 In other words, it is the individual’s act of free will that leads to 
social institutions that follow, not the other way around.172 From Kant’s 
perspective, in order to expand their range of freedom—that is, their autonomy—
people eventually agree to what Merges calls a system of “Mine and Yours.”173 
                                                                                                                 
added)). 
 165. Merges, however, remarks how well Locke’s charity proviso maps onto 
contemporary policy debates, and in particular patents on life-saving pharmaceutical patents. 
Id. at 65, 67. 
 166. Id. at 67. 
 167. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 148. 
 168. MERGES, supra note 28, at 66 (“Like a rare comet, they will be sighted every now 
and again, but they are not a steady and constant feature of the legal constellation.”). 
 169. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), reprinted in 
IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor, ed., trans., 1996); see also Brian 
Tierney, Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant, 62 J. HIST. IDEAS 381 
(2001). 
 170. MERGES, supra note 28, at 70. 
 171. Id. at 71. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 72; see also KANT, supra note 169, at 401 (“That is rightfully mine (meum 
iuris) with which I am so connected that another’s use of it without my consent would wrong 
me.”) (emphasis in original); B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF 
RIGHT: A COMMENTARY 94 (2010) (“The basis for extending our external freedom to include 
what Kant calls the ‘external mine and thine’ is the permissive law of practical reason.”). 
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Merges points out that Kant’s conceptualization is uniquely applicable to 
intellectual property and is just the sort of formulation that, in regards to 
intellectual property, sweeps up what Locke may have left behind. Because Kant 
focuses on the individual, “[t]he medium is not the message.”174 Merges argues that 
by departing from a central focus on the object, Kant’s formulation more 
satisfactorily justifies possession of intangible media—property of the digital 
age.175 This change in perspective, which stands in contrast to Locke’s and 
economics’ theory of property, acts as an excellent supplemental layer to the 
understanding of what is appropriately acquired ab initio: 
The principle of external Acquisition, then, may be expressed thus: 
“Whatever I bring under my power according to the Law of external 
Freedom, of which as an object of my free activity of Will I have the 
capability of making use according to the Postulate of the Practical 
Reason, and which I will to become mine in conformity with the Idea 
of a possible united common Will, is mine.”176 
This formulation, from Merges’s perspective, “gives human will the broadest 
possible canvas on which to operate.”177 Furthermore, and important to Merges, is 
that this open notion of property based on autonomy interests extends to things like 
plans to make a living and reputation. Kant’s system of property encourages “an 
expansive sense of the creator’s autonomy.”178 
As one might predict, to be a workable theory of property rights, Kant’s 
philosophy, like Locke’s, is also bounded. The doctrines that limit Kant’s 
expansive canvas are where the value of his philosophy lies with regard to thinking 
about the public interest factors in patent law. There are two doctrines that Merges 
explores that are particularly relevant. First is the notion of waiver, or the process 
wherein an appropriator of an object disclaims his or her individual possessory 
rights. Second, and most importantly, is Kant’s famous Universal Principle of 
Right (UPR).179 
Merges describes “waiver” as “the right to voluntarily surrender . . . property 
rights in something one owns.”180 Without the concept of waiver, a property right 
necessarily carries with it a duty to maximally enforce the rights—an obligation to 
improve oneself via the object of the appropriation. The key concept for Kant—and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. MERGES, supra note 28, at 74 (emphasis in original). 
 175. Id. at 76–77 (“Property is not just a matter of physical contact between person and 
object; it describes a relationship that is deeper and goes well beyond the basic acts of 
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 176. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
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 180. MERGES, supra note 28, at 84. 
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Merges—is that the grant of a property right is separate from enforcement of that 
right: “Enforcement is a matter to be decided not by the state but by individual 
rightholders.”181 Waiver is important conceptually because it gives property owners 
an important option not to enforce their rights and therefore share with others the 
stepping-stones of their autonomous plan to “do the sorts of projects they need to 
do.”182 
This doctrine aligns well with American patent law’s development of patent 
rights without a duty to work the patented invention.183 Like Merges’s 
interpretation of Kant’s conception, the U.S. Supreme Court in Continental Paper 
Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.184 “rejected the argument that a patent should be 
unenforceable because the patentee was not using the patented [technology] and 
was also continuing to exclude competitors from using the [technology].”185 The 
Court held that “such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the 
right conferred by the patent” and that “it is the privilege of any owner of property 
to use or not to use it, without question of motive.”186 As Merges’s philosophical 
framework adopts Kant’s notion of waiver, it supports the direction of American 
patent law and represents another key element to understanding when the public 
interest is or is not justifiable. As with waiver, it is up to the individual property 
owner to give up his or her rights, not the state.187 
The UPR, the true limiting principle of Kant’s theory on property rights, states 
that “rightful individual action must accord with rational, universal principles of 
right and wrong.”188 Merges’s interpretation of the UPR is that “property rights 
must be granted, because they are necessary to enhance human freedom,” but the 
rights are constrained and “must not be so broad that they interfere with the 
freedom of fellow citizens.”189 More so than Locke’s provisos, Kant’s UPR is 
broad and encompassing—it contemplates a much larger universe of constraints 
and brings in notions of equality and justice.190 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. Id. at 85. 
 182. Id. at 70. 
 183. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent 
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Merges is attracted to Kant’s restrictions because they straddle a world of 
conventional natural law, where intellectual property rights precede the formation 
of civil society or state, and conventional utilitarian calculus, where intellectual 
property rights are mere creatures of state discretion. The UPR is brilliant as 
applied to intellectual property because it allows intellectual property rights to 
remain fundamental rights while simultaneously allowing for state discretion to 
impose limits (as long as it does not derogate the fundamental right to appropriate 
intellectual property). This is because, in Kant’s conception of the property right, 
the state institutions that implement a property regime come after the individual’s 
need to appropriate (i.e., Kant’s progression: (1) the individual’s need, (2) the state 
institutions, and (3) the existence of property as a right). Kant’s logic allows state 
intermingling because it is not until the state acts that the system of property rights 
comes into existence. As Merges states, “IP rights are fundamental, but . . . they 
also of necessity must account for the needs and rights of others, because they are 
the product of an idealized set of social conventions.”191 
Summarizing, the major contribution from Kantian philosophy to Merges’s 
framework for justifying intellectual property is the conceptualization of 
intellectual property as a fundamental right. This move allows Merges to keep 
Lockean understandings of appropriation through labor—a meatier, more 
comprehensible vehicle for understanding the initial property grant—but to discard 
some of the Lockean notions of pure natural right, absent government. In turn, the 
UPR then softens the hard edges of the Lockean provisos, providing a more 
expansive, cushioned safety net for notions of equality and justice that Locke’s 
model does not quite adopt. 
3. John Rawls 
The third and final component of Merges’s foundation of his framework is John 
Rawls’s distributive justice theories, which clarify many of the Kantian notions of 
equality and justice and launch them into the twentieth century.192 The most 
important aspect of adding distributive justice models to the framework is to push 
the limits on property rights a little further past the boundaries established by the 
Lockean provisos and Kant’s UPR. The transition from Locke and Kant into a 
world of distributive justice, however, is far from smooth and, in the Author’s 
view, fundamentally clashes with the framework’s reliance on intellectual property 
as a fundamental right. In Rawls’s world, egalitarian fairness is of first priority and 
any system of property right is merely residue.193 Nonetheless, it is important to the 
viability of Merges’s framework to at least attempt to traverse the question of 
whether property in and of itself is fair. As Merges puts it: “the relevant 
question . . . is whether IP rights have a place in a society that aspires to a fair 
distribution of wealth.”194 
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Rawls presents two principles of justice that help determine whether society is 
fair and just. In relevant portion, Rawls states that: (1) “[e]ach person [should] have 
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all,” and (2) “economic inequalities [should] be 
arranged . . . to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.”195 Looking to the 
fairness of property specifically, Rawls, unlike Locke and Kant, defines personal 
property narrowly and constrictively. Rawls includes only those things that are 
absolutely essential to an “effective private, personal sphere”196: 
[A]mong the basic liberties of the person is the right to hold and to have 
the exclusive use of personal property. The role of this liberty is to 
allow a sufficient material basis for a sense of personal independence 
and self-respect, both of which are essential for the development and 
exercise of the moral powers.197 
Rawls goes on to specifically warn against a Lockean conception of property where 
basic rights include ownership over “means of production and natural resources” 
and also against other “wider conceptions.”198 Wider conceptions of property 
rights, Rawls argues, are not workable in a distributive model because such rights 
are decided after “society’s circumstances and historical traditions [are] 
available.”199 
Rawls’s mention of “society’s circumstances and historical traditions” is a 
reference to his overarching theory of political liberalism in which all societal 
choices must be made in an “original position,”200 where no one knows how life’s 
dice will be cast. That is, in Rawls’s hypothetical “original position,” all decisions 
about how a society should be structured and how it should function are made in a 
vacuum or a “veil of ignorance”201—one in which those deciding don’t know 
anything about their future cultural or societal status. Therefore, in order for 
intellectual property to be considered a right in Rawls’s perspective, Merges must 
“show that reasonable people who were setting up a social and economic system 
would agree to establish an intellectual property system as a matter of right.”202 In a 
world where intellectual property ownership likely benefits only a small, 
specialized group of individuals, Merges’s task is daunting. 
Merges traverses this problem by pivoting and presenting a system of property 
rights to those in the original position that inherently includes limiting principles 
such as Kant’s UPR. Merges’s framework incorporates the idea that “provision[s] 
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for the destitute and other social needs”203 are “baked in,”204 or inseparable from, 
property rights. Merges recognizes that “[s]ocial influences go into the making of 
creative works, so societal claims deserve to be thought of as integral to the rights 
that cover those works.”205 In that way, Merges softens the binary notions that there 
are either intellectual property rights that are not arranged “to the greatest benefit to 
the least advantaged,”206 as required by Rawls’s First Principle, or that there simply 
are no intellectual property rights. Merges shades Rawls’s black and white world 
with some hues of gray—enough gray area that those in the original position might 
reasonably agree to a system of property that is part of a set of basic liberties.207 
If those in the “original position” would ultimately agree to include intellectual 
property as a “basic liberty”—not a small assumption, to say the least208—the 
specifics of how Merges’s framework operates can be explored. It is at this point 
that Merges’s framework begins to truly come together and becomes a powerful 
analytical prism to explore intellectual property rights without having to speak 
directly about utilitarian justifications for the property right in the first place. The 
framework rests on the theories of Locke and Kant to justify and conceptualize the 
initial property grant. The Lockean provisos and Kant’s UPR limit the initial grant 
based on the needs of others (but, remember that these limits tend to “lead a mostly 
closeted existence”209). Only after intellectual property is fundamentally rooted as 
an individual right or a “basic liberty,” providing its owners with the Kantian 
autonomy to thrive and prosper, do distributive theories come into play. 
Distributive theories curtail only “the way an IP right is deployed,” not the way 
they are granted.210 Because “[r]ights that are fair when granted may turn out to 
harm third parties,” the framework provides “a second opportunity to assess the 
distributional impacts of IP law.”211 The assessment, in Merges’s model, can be 
best conceptualized by envisioning the intellectual property right having “two 
separate components: [a core] inviolable individual contribution . . . and a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. MERGES, supra note 28, at 110. 
 204. Id. at 123. 
 205. Id. at 122. We are all influenced by our surroundings and our society, through 
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 210. MERGES, supra note 28, at 129 (emphasis in original). 
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component . . . owing its origins to social forces and factors.”212 This second 
component, “the periphery,”213 symbolizes that “society retains a stake in every 
work” because, in almost every imaginable case, “forces beyond an individual 
creator go into . . . creative work[s].”214 In that way, distributive justice is internal 
to any property rights and a balance must be maintained. In most cases, time 
limitations on rights that make sure intellectual property is eventually placed in the 
public domain215 and taxation216 are the primary—and sufficient—vehicles for 
effectuating distributional justice under Merges’s model. Thus, the framework, 
fully assembled, satisfies the two Rawlsian principles of justice;217 the first is 
overlapped by the consideration of the Lockean provisos, particularly Kant’s UPR, 
and the second is satisfied because intellectual property benefits the worst off 
because its special rewards have a “net positive distributional effect” via taxation 
and time-limits.218 
B. Other Justifying Intellectual Property Considerations and Principles 
After setting up the foundational layers of his framework, Merges moves on to 
discuss the so-called midlevel principles and other highly specific issues that 
complete the model. Merges espouses four midlevel principles, or “concepts that 
run through and tie together disparate doctrines and practices, and that provide a 
common policy vocabulary that bridges different foundational viewpoints.”219 All 
four principles220 are important to understanding Merges’s framework, but only 
one, proportionality, has major implications on the use of public interest in Section 
337 investigations at the ITC and in federal district court patent litigation. 
For Merges, proportionality is the principle that supports the proposition that 
“[t]he size or scope of an IP right ought to be proportional to the value or 
significance of the work covered by the right.”221 It is in this principle that Merges 
explores eBay222 and, tangentially, the issues of denying permanent injunctions—a 
result that he considers “a serious inroad on one of the classic appurtenances of a 
property right.”223 Under a normative understanding of intellectual property as a 
fundamental right, one would agree with the Federal Circuit’s historical “automatic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. Id. at 121. 
 213. Id. 
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injunction rule,” where a party successfully shown to infringe a patent would be 
enjoined from making, using, or selling the infringing product, method, etc. Indeed, 
from a high-level prospective, it is difficult to reconcile how any other rule would 
not totally undermine the classic appurtenance of a property owner’s basic ability 
to exclude others. Merges explains that where there is “undue leverage” or 
“economic power beyond what is legitimate,” a notion of proportionality prevents 
an injunction where it would not serve the public interest.224 
Merges only sees this function of the proportionality principle as proper where 
there is clearly “undue leverage” or, in other words, “[w]here the unregulated 
market price of a property right moves radically out of alignment with underlying 
social utility, an institutional response is called for.”225 Unlike strict libertarian 
theorists, Merges argues that “if there is a pervasive understanding that property 
rights can be adjusted after the fact and at the margin to take account of changed 
circumstances or urgent social needs, this understanding will naturally be 
incorporated into the settled expectations of all property holders.”226 Occasional 
rebalances would, therefore, not disrupt the settled expectations of property 
holders.227 This notion of correction for social imbalances aligns with Merges’s 
conception of Rawlsian distributive justice: because society, at least in “the 
periphery,”228 contributes to the value of any piece of intellectual property,229 
rebalancing the reward between the owner and society is justifiable and a matter of 
appropriate fairness.230 As can be seen from Merges’s choice of language, however, 
the adjustments that he contemplates as being governed by an ex post 
proportionality principle are those that are “radical imbalances”231 and “urgent 
social needs.”232 It is an “[i]mportant, but [m]odest, [p]rinciple”: “[the] business of 
court intervention into private market ordering is and should be a highly unusual 
event.”233 
III. APPLYING THE MERGES FRAMEWORK 
Understanding Merges’s foundational framework, which is based on a 
combination of Locke’s provisos and his labor theory of appropriation, Kant’s 
UPR, and Rawls’s distributive justice—as well as Merges’s midlevel 
proportionality principle—allows one to think about specific applications of the 
framework. Merges tackles many specific issues as a final feature of his book, but 
he does not address the use of the public interest factors in Section 337 ITC 
investigations. The Commission’s broad authority to deny exclusion orders based 
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on the public interest raises serious questions about the justifiability of doing so. 
And, while actions at the ITC may indeed be fundamentally different from civil 
actions under the “the long-standing principle that importation is treated differently 
than domestic activity,”234 Section 337 investigations provide a unique look at 
public interest considerations. The only remedies available at the ITC are injunctive 
remedies—the ITC cannot award money damages.235 By studying cases where the 
possibility of monetary remedies as a way to balance the harms236 is removed, we 
can eliminate variables and isolate the binary decision to derogate a patent owner’s 
right to exclude or not. 
Applying the Merges framework to the three instances at the ITC, where 
permanent exclusion orders were denied to complaintants in light of the public 
interest, helps illuminate the justifiability of doing so. 
A. Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders 
In Crankpin Grinders, the patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 3,118,258 (the ’258 
patent), claimed a machine that automatically grinded crankpins for use in internal 
combustion engines in passenger cars. The invention, and true intellectual property, 
was in the fact that the machine required no human intervention to perform the 
rotary indexing of the crankpin grinder from one pin to another.237 In other words, 
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the machine could automatically index in order to grind all of the various pins on 
the crankshaft without human intervention. 
Starting with the initial consideration of appropriation, using Merges’s 
articulation of Lockean labor theory, the inventors, Ralph Price and Harold 
Balsiger,238 expended effort to develop and appropriate the grinding technology.239 
By mixing their labor with the universe of prior art (similar to the realm of nature, 
as discussed above240), the inventors have valid dominion over the technology. The 
inventors’ labor was not merely a trivial step or obvious progression in the art—the 
technology was the result of labor plus ingenuity. In fact, the invention was 
declared non-obvious and useful241 by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) upon its initial grant. Similarly, under Kantian notions of initial 
appropriation, Price and Balsiger “imposed their will on things”242 in order to 
further their individual plans, objects, and goals—their appropriation of automatic 
crankpin grinding technology helped to expand their free will (or, at least the free 
will of the Landis Tool Corporation, the assignee of the patent243). Initial 
appropriation is justifiable because it is essential to the creators’ autonomy. 
Under Merges’s framework, initial appropriation may be limited or bounded, 
even if such rights are rarely bounded from the outset. Looking at the Lockean 
provisos,244 it is clear that there was no issue with the sufficiency proviso. The 
inventors appropriated a right to a technology that does not raise concerns about 
leaving “enough, and as good”245 for others—there is still room in the field for 
others to operate as can be seen from four patents issued over the span of a few 
decades referencing the ’258 patent.246 “Reliance” arguments under the sufficiency 
proviso are only appealing at first glance. Because it is easy to image that 
automobile manufacturers came to rely on automatic crankpin grinders in an 
important way, so much so that removing access to them would work a significant 
harm, it is tempting to grasp onto reliance as justifying a limitation. Reliance, 
however, is reserved for nearly earth shattering movements in culture—for 
example, the Internet or the car as a means for transportation—whereas “[m]ost 
contributions to culture are more like isolated drops in a lake.”247 Automatic 
crankpin grinders cannot reasonably constitute an example of such a movement. 
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Similarly, the spoliation proviso does not limit the right because Landis Tool 
Corporation was working the patent, producing crankpin grinders. Recall that, 
under Merges’s conception, spoliation does not refer to unsatisfied market 
demand.248 While the Commission insinuated that the unsatisfied demand in the 
marketplace was a significant reason behind denying an injunction,249 using 
spoliation as a valid justification would require that Landis put their crankpin 
grinder technology to absolutely no productive use.250 Locke’s third proviso, the 
charity proviso, is not invoked because Landis is in no way letting its brothers 
“perish for want” by enforcing their patent claims to automatic crankpin grinding 
technology.251 Even if the relevant perspective was stretched to include the long-
term implications of not using cars with lower fuel efficiency,252 which might 
impinge on the human race’s ability to prosper and flourish,253 it likely would still 
not invoke the proviso under Merges’s framework without bearing down on true 
and measurable life-or-death matters. 
Kant’s UPR254 should also be considered in evaluating the initial property grant. 
The broad and malleable nature of the UPR focuses the inquiry on the question of 
whether the right “interfere[s] with the freedom of [other] citizens.”255 Under 
Kantian theory, the state is permitted to limit the scope of the right, but since the 
appropriation of the technology here does not create a prima facie case of 
interference with the freedom of other citizens, the right is not justifiably limited 
from the outset. Rather, the appropriation here is exactly the type of permissible 
control that Kant envisions—it is crucial to the development of Landis, Price, and 
Balsiger’s goals, and to their autonomy. It simply does not raise the fundamental 
moral concerns that the UPR stands to protect. 
After examining the pregrant considerations of intellectual property rights, it is 
clear that if the derogation or limitation of a right is to be justifiable in light of 
“public interest,” it must be justified according to the postgrant doctrines. In 
Merges’s view, this makes perfect sense because “[t]he dynamic nature of IP in 
practice makes the postgrant stage the crucial time for bringing balance to the IP 
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system.”256 It does not make logical sense, given the incentives created by a system 
of intellectual property rights, to limit intellectual property based on merely 
speculative concerns at the time of the initial appropriation, but rather to wait until 
more information about the distributive fairness of the property right is in hand. 
In Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the Commission majority stated that 
“[t]he public as a whole has an interest in conserving fuel through the provision of 
energy efficient alternatives represented in this case by automobiles.”257 The 
independent government agencies best positioned to provide an objective statement 
of the balance between the “core” and “periphery” of the property right258 stated 
that they had “no comment to make on the certain automatic crankpin grinder 
investigation.”259 Instead, information about the public’s stake in the periphery of 
the patent claims was provided by General Motors Corporation and Caterpillar 
Tractor Company—parties with biased interests.260 For example, Caterpillar alleged 
that there was a “direct relationship between excluding importation of machines 
and the ability of U.S. engine manufacturers to extend or refine engine 
manufacturing capabilities.”261 From the record, it was clear that Landis was not 
able to deliver new automatic crankpin grinders in a “commercially reasonable 
length of time.”262 As such, the public, at least under the perspective of the 
Respondents, General Motors and Caterpillar, indeed had a stake in periphery of 
the intellectual property right that was positioned to be undermined by excluding 
importation. 
What is not clear is whether it was the public that the interested parties were 
truly concerned about—companies like Ford and GM were struggling to profitably 
compete with foreign automobile manufacturers and were struggling to survive 
during a recession that struck hardest on the automobile manufacturing industry.263 
It is also not clear that the public was at significant risk of not having fuel-efficient 
cars during a limited time of a supposed energy crisis, as foreign manufactures may 
have been able to supply the market. Under Rawlsian distributive justice, Landis’s 
ownership of the intellectual property at issue was not disrupting each person’s 
right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties264 or disrupting the 
“greatest benefit of the least advantaged.”265 While it may be that Ford and GM 
could ultimately provide cheaper fuel-efficient cars to the public without having to 
worry about the property rights of Landis, Merges has shown how that position, by 
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itself, would make a mere sham of property rights. It will almost always be the case 
that open-access to property in technology would lead to cheaper goods, but the 
true social and systemic costs quickly outweigh that myopic, short-term goal. 
Looking to the proportionality principle for further clarification of the balance 
between the core and periphery of Landis’s intellectual property right, the principle 
reaffirms that the alleged harm was not one that disrupted the equality and justice 
owed to the public. Analyzing whether the size of the intellectual property right is 
commensurate with the value of the work shows that Landis’s enforcement was 
well within the appropriate bounds. The technology was developed with ingenuity 
over time266 and resulted in a machine that could automatically grind all of the 
crankpins on a crankshaft. The efficiencies that resulted were tremendous and 
commanded a market value of over $250,000. At the same time, Landis’s “prices 
were lower than the prices of the imported grinders” and Landis had “licensed its 
patent to another domestic producer as well as on a spot basis to a foreign 
producer.”267 In other words, as the dissenting commissioners implied, Landis in no 
way wielded “economic power beyond what is legitimate”268—the facts show a 
dearth of “undue leverage.”269 There is no “radical imbalance” present,270 and there 
is no proof of a nexus between GM and Ford’s need for automatic crankpin 
grinders to compete in the market place and the ongoing “energy crisis” that may 
have perhaps constituted an “urgent social need.”271 Technology developments or 
components other than a machine that automatically indexed the diameter of 
various crankpins could have allowed GM and Ford to meet fuel efficiency goals. 
Automatically grinded crankpins were likely but a very small contributor to the 
goal of fuel efficient automobiles. 
B. Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes 
Like Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the facts of Certain Inclined-Field 
Acceleration Tubes are not ripe for addressing the question of limits on the initial 
appropriation of rights. True, it is tempting to use the facts surrounding Certain 
Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes as an example of when no property rights should 
initially be conferred because of the sense that nuclear development is a societal, 
national-security issue. Merges’s framework, however, demands that the inquiry 
focus on “property, but”: “The result . . . is to reject both the ‘property first’ and 
‘property last’ approaches. Instead [to] advocate something closer to ‘property, 
but.’”272 Limitations based on the Lockean provisos are not warranted, and Kant’s 
UPR does not run afoul when the property claims do not affect societal equality 
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and justice from the outset. Under Kantian theory, it may be permissible for the 
state to decide that patent claims that bear on issues of national defense should not 
be conferred. And, in fact, the United States already has such a provision, but 
decided not to use it when issuing U.S. Patent No 3,308,323 (the ’323 patent). 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 181, the Commission of Patents has the responsibility to limit 
property grants that have national security implications: 
Whenever the publication or disclosure of an invention by the 
publication of an application or by the granting of a 
patent . . . might . . . be detrimental to the national security, he shall 
make the application for patent in which such invention is disclosed 
available for inspection to the Atomic Energy Commission, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of any other department or 
agency of the Government designated by the President as a defense 
agency of the United States.273 
No such detriment was found for the ’323 patent, so it can be fairly assumed that 
the claimed tube technology was considered by the state to have no prima facie 
national security implications. As such, limits on initial appropriation continue their 
mostly “closeted existence.”274 
Limitations to consider, therefore, come by way of postgrant doctrines. Similar 
to Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, the government agencies that were 
positioned to best determine whether the public had a sufficient enough stake in the 
“periphery” of the intellectual property right to justify denying an exclusion order 
declined to file statements of the public interest during the investigation.275 
However, the National Science Foundation, an independent government agency, 
filed a statement opposing an exclusion order. While the Commission partially 
justified the denial of an exclusion order on its notion “that basic scientific 
research, such as the nuclear structure research . . . is precisely the kind of activity 
intended by Congress to be included when it required the Commission to 
consider . . . the public health and welfare,” it readily admits that the “benefits to 
public health and welfare of pure research are indirect and perhaps more difficult to 
demonstrate.”276 The Commission awkwardly discussed the “patent monopoly” as a 
way to “recover research and development expense and provide a financial 
reward,”277 as if the property right in patents is merely a conduit for financial 
gain,278 carelessly brushing aside the fundamental ownership of the property. The 
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Commission, sensing an inequality and injustice, blundered through its analysis but 
ultimately reached the correct outcome. 
The ITC’s analysis would greatly benefit from an understanding of Merges’s 
framework. The Commission had all of the right facts to deny the remedy, without 
any of the coherent logic. The focus should have been on the “undue leverage” 
created by the facts of the case in conjunction with the public’s extra strong stake in 
the property claim. The Commission correctly pointed out that the property 
owners’ property was subsidized by society—more so than what normally occurs—
because of the government’s infusion of money into this particular research 
industry. Here the “core” and “periphery” of the right are different from what is 
typical: the periphery is much larger. That aspect of proportionality is coupled with 
another aspect: the property right was creating more economic leverage in favor of 
HVEC than it deserved, commensurate with its ownership in the “core” of the right. 
First, the imported tubes were not interchangeable with the claimed tubes. The 
imported Dowlish tubes had different geometries that allowed for “greater 
performance per dollar.”279 While there was testimony to contradict the 
performance claims, the fact remained that unless an exclusion order was denied, 
many research institutes would have to pause research, incur large retrofitting 
expenses, or close facilities outright. At a time when society and the state had 
overriding needs—maybe even “urgent needs”—in light of nuclear arms 
development, and also had an abnormally large periphery ownership in 
development of an intellectual property right, the state properly denied the “core” 
property owner its right to exclude in this limited instance. 
C. Certain Baseband Processor Chips 
As with the two previous fact patterns, the initial appropriation of the inventions 
claimed in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,374,311; 6,714,983; 5,682,379; 6,359,872, and 
6,583,675, all of which relate to cellular device microchips and cellular telephone 
handsets, was valid and justifiable under Lockean and Kantian theory, as adopted 
by Merges. This case, however, represents another situation where, because of 
changes in the marketplace, the patentee arguably garnered undue economic 
leverage. Interestingly, however, the facts and timing of Certain Baseband 
Processor Chips provide a great case study for the rarely seen “reliance” aspect of 
the proportionality principle and Lockean sufficiency proviso.280 
While the complainant, Broadcom, only named one respondent, Qualcomm, the 
true international scale and implications of the investigation was evident from the 
intervening parties: Cellco d/b/a Verizon Wireless, LG Electronics Mobilecomm, 
Motorola, Kyocera, Sprint Nextel Corporation, Samsung Electronics,281 and 
eventually nonparty intervenors T-Mobile and AT&T Mobility.282 The intervenors 
were permitted to submit evidence and statements regarding the remedy and 
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bonding phase of the investigation—the public interest. In other words, the 
exclusion of Qualcomm chips in light of Broadcom’s patented property affected 
nearly every major cellular mobile service provider and manufacturer in the world. 
At the time of the investigation there were approximately 215 million cell phone 
users in the United States,283 roughly 70 percent of the entire resident population.284 
As Wendy Gordon might argue, the introduction, or really the tidal wave, of 
mobile devices with the feature claimed in the disputed patents shifted the cultural 
“baseline.”285 The original creator, Broadcom, added something to the culture of 
society that society came to depend on so heavily that removing access to that 
something would actually injure society. The importance of Broadcom’s 
technology in relation to the nation’s reliance on mobile networks and particularly 
the speed of 3G broadband services is enormous—the reliance ranges from 
individual citizens to large-scale societal security.286 While Broadcom was not 
trying to outright exclude any public access to their microchip technology, Gordon 
and Merges might still agree that the practical effects of an exclusion order against 
Qualcomm would be close enough to an outright exclusion to work a similar public 
harm. And, even if the reliance aspect of the proportionality argument is not 
sufficient to justify derogating Broadcom’s fundamental right to the intellectual 
property it appropriated, other notions of undue leverage fit in seamlessly to 
reinforce the proportionality arguments. Namely, due to the “standards-type”287 
nature of the microchips and a lack of satisfactory non-infringing alternatives, 
Broadcom wielded too much economic force over the marketplace. This is true 
even if Broadcom did not lay in wait like the “bad-actors” or nonpracticing entities 
discussed or addressed in eBay.288 
The Commission, not able to articulate a reliance argument like that of 
Gordon’s, and without the philosophical framework to appreciate the undue-
leverage aspect of proportionality, grasped at national-security type justification for 
limiting the general exclusion order.289 The Commission stated that “public safety 
officials appear to be increasingly relying on the data capabilities of 3G 
telecommunications networks in carrying out their functions, and anticipate that 
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this reliance will greatly increase in the near future.”290 The Commission also 
considered the domestic economy and individual citizen’s access to the technology 
in constructing an order but never quite pulled it all together. Nevertheless, the 
Commission fashioned a wise and thoughtfully balanced remedy. The Commission, 
in full recognition of the fundamental nature of the property, studied its fully 
developed record to find where the least injury would be worked on society, the 
owners of the “periphery,” and Broadcom, the owner of the “core.” The 
Commission allowed some already imported chips and handsets to be exempt from 
the exclusion order (that is, those devices which the public and the market had 
already come to rely on), while excluding the majority of future imports.291 
IV. ADOPTING A FRAMEWORK 
Areas of success and failure within the Commission’s analysis can be identified 
by examining the ITC cases in which general exclusion orders were denied. For 
example, as discussed above, the dissenting commissioner’s views in Certain 
Automatic Crankpin Grinders provided a close example of a philosophically and 
morally justifiable approach to addressing the public interest in patent litigation. 
That commissioner was correct in first identifying the patent as a fundamental 
property right.292 Also, that commissioner, when stating that “Congress was 
particularly concerned about price gouging or monopolistic practices,”293 was 
resonating notions of undue leverage. In comparison, the majority in Certain 
Automatic Crankpin Grinders lost focus of what was truly the public interest 
comparison. In another example, the Commission in Certain Baseband Processor 
Chips developed a very robust record that explored the public interest implications 
from a variety of facets and always kept a focus on the patent right and not just the 
interests in the patent claims. The Commission was able to construct a remedy that 
was neatly tailored and commensurate with ownership stakes in the core and 
periphery, given the reliance and undue leverage involved. 
What is most evident from examining the ITC cases, however, is that the 
Commission lacked a framework for its analysis. Left stranded with only the mere 
phrase “the effect of such an exclusion upon the public health and welfare” to grasp 
onto, the Commission was free to stumble towards its own subjective conclusions 
about when it is appropriate to derogate a property owner’s right to exclude. It is at 
this juncture that the cases from the ITC begin to spill their lessons over to patent 
cases that arise in federal district courts under the Patent Act. Regardless of 
whether there is a “long-standing principle that importation is treated differently 
than domestic activity,”294 the two forums can learn from one another to better 
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understand when the public interest can justifiably be used to trump a property 
right. In fact, one commentator has already argued that the “biggest and most 
unique advantage of the § 337 litigation—exclusion orders—could be brought in 
under the Patent Act.”295 Professor Dennis Crouch has commented that “[i]f the 
ITC continues to give more weight to the public interest factor, the result is that 
ITC exclusion orders may begin to parallel the injunction that a court would have 
ordered under eBay.”296 Both forums would benefit from guidance, factors, or 
waypoints to assist when those forums are called upon to venture past the patent as 
a property right and right to exclude that it confers. This is especially true going 
forward as the public interest factors take a front seat in litigation and as “the 
remarkable ongoing expansion of the subject matter covered by various intellectual 
property rights” continues.297 
In that regard, implementing a new doctrine of patent misuse that clearly adopts 
a “property, but” approach to deciding when exclusion orders should or should not 
be granted might be a satisfactory means of providing a guiding framework. A new 
patent misuse doctrine could be fashioned to heed Judge O’Malley’s call from 
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corporation that “even though a 
successful patent infringement plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other 
short-cuts to support a request for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that 
courts should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights 
granting the owner the right to exclude,”298 and to also coherently verbalize the 
notions of “undue leverage” that can be distilled from the statements of the Court in 
eBay.299 
A patent misuse doctrine aligns well with the direction of Merges’s framework. 
Specifically, after carefully working through the philosophical and moral 
justifications for property as a fundamental right, Merges realizes that limits to 
rights are most justifiable at a postgrant stage. Most commonly, it is only after first 
recognizing property as a fundamental, constitutionally empowered right, derived 
from organic U.S. law as a form of private property,300 that it is appropriate to 
consider limits on those rights as proportionality and distributive fairness demand. 
Moreover, as Merges states, “[t]he dynamic nature of IP in practice makes the 
postgrant stage the crucial time for bringing balance to the IP system.”301 
Such a doctrine will be important not only in light of the increased awareness of 
the public interest factors, but also in light of new technologies that in recent years 
have been brought about through scientific endeavor. For example, with modern 
advances in genetics, and with cases like Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
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U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“Myriad”)302 taking the limelight in patent 
litigation, some believe that patents concerning genetic engineering and designer 
babies are possibly not far away. One commentator has noted that the “[US]PTO 
inevitably will grant patents on biological discoveries with such eugenic 
potential.”303 
Modern medicine currently has the ability to regenerate full fingers from certain 
cellular matrices and to grow completely new livers from a combination of fetal 
cells and cadaver organs,304 and the future will only bring about more options. Such 
new, culturally divisive technologies will raise important questions about the 
justifiability of both the initial property grant and the postgrant restrictions. It is in 
those moments of divisiveness that a strong, philosophically sound framework for 
the understanding of patents as rights will be of most value. New technologies have 
the potential to direct discordant results in different jurisdictions across the United 
States without a patent misuse doctrine that commands some uniformity. 
Currently, the doctrine of patent misuse is limited statutorily by 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271. The statute is written in the negative stating first that “[n]o patent owner 
otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done 
one or more of the following”305 and then enumerating scenarios. The proscribed 
scenarios, such as “refus[ing] to license or use any rights to the patent,”306 helps 
ensure that the ownership rights that the patent confers are not arbitrarily 
diminished. It also tries to recognize distributive inequality through economic 
anticompetiveness such as when it states that it is not misuse to condition the 
license of a patent “on the acquisition of a license to rights in another 
patent . . . unless . . . the patent owner has market power in the relevant market.”307 
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The current patent misuse doctrine, however, only goes halfway. It does not 
clearly articulate the philosophically justifiable notions it tries to protect or, at best, 
does so in a nonsequential order. A new patent misuse doctrine that borrows from 
the conclusions utilized in Merges’s framework could help guide both courts and 
litigants who face issues of public interest. A clear articulation of a “property, but” 
formula would provide a philosophically justifiable roadmap for an analysis. 
Ultimately, such a use of the framework is likely what Merges had in mind as he 
tried to create a justification for intellectual property that is a “lock-solid, airtight 
case, a case we can confidently take to an unbiased jury of hardheaded social 
scientists.”308 
CONCLUSION 
This Article posits that “public interest” factors are likely to take a more 
prominent role in patent litigation arising under the Patent Act in federal district 
courts and under Section 337 investigations at the ITC. At the ITC, with the recent 
changes in the rules governing the statutory public interest factors in Section 337 
forcing litigants to make public interest statements at the onset, parties will be 
spending more time and resources on public interest arguments.309 In the district 
court, the transition from the “automatic rule,” where injunctions were denied in 
only “rare instances,” to a post-eBay world, where in one in four cases an 
injunction is denied, the “public interest” prong of the four factor test is now 
positioned front-and-center.310 Moreover, with new developments in the sciences 
that have spawned the “pervasive creep of technology into formerly sacrosanct 
areas of life,” the public interest component will likely be a tool used to resist that 
progression.311 
Since “[a] patent is a property right” and “[m]ost people associate property 
rights with ownership” or the right to exclude,312 using the public interest to 
derogate that right is a step that should not be lightly taken. Careful consideration is 
necessary before denying a patent owner’s ability to exclude, since it has the 
potential not only to disrupt the delicate balance of incentives that the patent system 
provides, but to undermine the philosophical and fundamental rights inherent in our 
society. Professor Robert Merges has recognized the value of such careful 
consideration. The purpose of Merges’s book, Justifying Intellectual Property, was 
to provide an analytical framework, rooted in the pillars of philosophy that 
acknowledges intellectual property as a fundamental right foremost. This Comment 
has distilled Merges’s framework into a form applicable to studying several cases 
in which the public interest was found by the ITC to overcome the patent owner’s 
right to exclude. In that way, this Comment has attempted to “justify” the public 
interest. 
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Applying Merges’s framework, based on Lockean appropriations, Kantian 
Universal Rights, and Rawlsian ideas of distributive justice, this Comment has 
shown that in “public interest” cases thus far, the ITC has lacked consistency and 
coherency in its rationale. In the future, there will be a need for a patent misuse 
doctrine that codifies a clear framework for derogating property rights in the name 
of public interest. Without a flexible, but clear, framework, both the ITC and 
Article III federal courts will be free to subjectively interpret the public interest as 
they see fit. The discordant results would be counter to the patent law uniformity 
that was expressly mandated by Congress when it formed of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit. 
 
